I am a professor of philosophy at Franklin & Marshall College, and teach courses that are mostly oriented to our Cognitive Science and Moral Psychology majors. My research focuses on understanding what it is to be a person as a distinctive sort of free and responsible social agent. Central to my approach is a concern with the “evaluative attitudes”—caring, valuing, loving, respecting, etc.—and the holistic rational patterns of emotions in terms of which they are intelligible.
Areas of Specialization: Moral Psychology, Social Ontology, Philosophy of Mind, Emotions
Areas of Competence: Philosophy of Race and Gender
2013–: Elijah E. Kresge Professor of Philosophy, Franklin & Marshall College
2007–13: Professor, Franklin & Marshall College
2001–07: Associate Professor, Franklin & Marshall College
1995–2001: Assistant Professor, Franklin & Marshall College
PhD in Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 1994
MA in Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 1990
BA in Philosophy, Carleton College, 1988
The central aim of my research has been to understand more deeply the kind of rationality characteristic of us persons, and I have argued both (a) that such rationality, rather than being opposed to the emotions, instead is an essentially emotional rationality (what I call a “rationality of import”) and (b) that such rationality is not intelligible apart from our social relations with others. Consequently, I believe it is a mistake to conceive of us persons as divided into distinct theoretical and practical sides or to approach understanding personhood via distinct metaphysical and moral notions. The rationality of import, as I have understood it, is simultaneously both practical and theoretical: our being the sort of epistemic agents we are rests on our practical capacities collectively to value (and to hold each other responsible to) public, objective truth, and our being the sort of moral agents we are depends on our epistemic abilities to contest and so ultimately to discover what has objective value. Moreover, the “metaphysical” capacities we have for autonomous, rational, and responsible agency are capacities we ourselves construct via the interpersonal commitments to import we collectively undertake. The result is that through our practical agency, we jointly construct ourselves as persons in a way that is simultaneously answerable to our experience of personhood itself.
I reach this conclusion over the course of three books in which I find moral psychology and value theory deeply intertwined with philosophy of mind and emotions and with social ontology. My work is highly systematic, with these books taking me from a consideration of (1) intrapersonal values and identity, to (2) interpersonal values in intimate relationships, to (3) communal norms and values in the context of non-intimate “communities of respect”, all of which lead to my current research to the objectivity of social identities.
One characteristic of us persons is that we value things as a part of the kind of life we each find worth living, thereby partially constituting our identities as the particular persons we are, such that part of our autonomy consists in our ability to determine what our values shall be. On the other hand, we persons can also rationally deliberate about what really is valuable in our lives, thereby potentially coming to discover who we are. Yet such autonomous invention and rational discovery of personal values might seem to be in tension with one another (how can personal values be something we simultaneously both invent and discover?), and this book aims to resolve that tension by developing an account of the relation between emotions and value (or of “import” more generally) that enables me to reject the rational and ontological priority implicit in this formulation of the tension.
In developing this account, I focus not on particular kinds of emotions but rather on the sorts of rational patterns emotions can form, arguing that such patterns constitute what it is for things to have import to one. The kind of rationality involved in these patterns of emotions is what I call a “rationality of import”, and it does not fit neatly into standard ways of thinking about practical or theoretical rationality. If we accept (as I do) the Davidsonian thesis that mental capacities are to be understood in terms of rationality, such a rethinking of rationality means reconceiving the nature of the mind quite generally and of believing and desiring in particular. This enables me to make sense of the distinctive rational role emotions play both in relation to desire and evaluative judgment, thereby dissolving the above tension, and in relation to motivation, thereby making intelligible how we can have rational control over what we do and yet be susceptible to even strong forms of weakness of will. Indeed, I argue that this is essential to presenting an account of the mind adequate to a serious moral psychology.
We persons are social animals, partly insofar as we are able to form intimate relationships with others and thereby can come to share our lives, our identities, and our capacity for autonomy with others in relationships of love and friendship. In this book, I argue against various forms of individualism and egocentrism I find implicit in many other accounts of love and friendship, and I present an alternative account of love as intimate identification in terms of interpersonal rational patterns of emotions. On the one hand this enables me to explain how a caregiver in a loving relationship with a child can provide the child with access to reasons (for being neat or for being moral) that otherwise might seem “external” to the child’s existing motivations. On the other hand, this account of love enables me to present a rich account of shared agency and ultimately of friendship in terms of the notions of plural agents (who not only share certain ends but also the cares motivating those ends) and plural persons (who share values and hence a conception of the kind of life worth their living together) and to show how they can, partly through their rationally intertwined emotions, deliberate together and exercise joint autonomy over their shared lives.
To make sense of persons, we must consider as well the non-intimate relationships we have with others who are in community with us. In this book I join other Strawsonians in thinking that the reactive attitudes and the ways we hold each other responsible are central to our being responsible agents at all. Yet in contrast to other accounts, I reject the explanatory priority of the reactive attitudes over our being responsible agents: our reactive attitudes are appropriate in part because they are directed at responsible agents, while simultaneously someone is a responsible agent because they are an appropriate target of the reactive attitudes. I make sense of such circularity as non-vicious by appealing to interpersonal, rational patterns of reactive attitudes, which I argue constitute the community itself, communal norms and values as our norms and values, and so individual members of the community as bound by those norms and as having the authority to hold each other responsible to them. Consequently, we in the community collectively respect each other as members, and each as one of us ought therefore to respect the others as members. Such an account is not second-personal but first-person plural, a conclusion that has several important implications for the social dimension of us persons. First, responsibility is social: to be a responsible agent requires that one have the capacity for reactive attitudes, a capacity that one can develop and sustain only as a member of a community of respect. Second, rationality has a social dimension: insofar as it is we collectively who have authority over ourselves, we must reject a Humean conception of practical reason (as depending on one’s “subjective motivation set”, say) and recognize an essentially social dimension to practical reason and the possible connections and conflicts among such social reasons and individual reasons grounded in, for example, personal values. Finally, identity is social: a community of respect can shape and define certain social identities by prescribing or proscribing communal values as elements of the kind of life worth its members living.
Recent Work. In the last few years I have begun to apply these ideas to the topic of social construction, especially of social roles and identities. Social roles and identities presuppose an at least rough-and-ready understanding of them in virtue of which the various communal norms and values that partly define them hang together as a coherent whole that can have a point in our lives. Indeed, these understandings must normally come to inform the patterns of participants’ reactive attitudes constituting those norms and values and hence the role itself. This makes room for the possibility that participants’ experiences of themselves as occupants of these roles is inconsistent with the background understandings and point, providing empirical purchase for rationally contesting those understandings and hence the norms and roles themselves. Whereas others think about such contestation as grounded in unjust consequences of these social roles, my claim is that they can also be grounded in the roles themselves being ontologically misconstructed. That is, our construction of social roles and identities can be objective in that our activities of construction can come to be answerable to the very roles and identities they thereby construct in a way that opens up the possibility of our getting these roles and identities themselves wrong.
Ultimately my aim is to provide an account of moral values as the communal values of the community of respect of all persons, a community in which these values and our personhood itself are both socially constructed and contestable.
Links to preprints are to the first chapter.
Full PDFs of final books are available on request.
Communities of Respect: Persons, Dignity, and the Reactive Attitudes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Categories: agency, moral psychology, personhood, rationality, social ontology, value theory. Preprint.
Communities of respect are communities of people sharing common practices or a (partial) way of life; they include families, clubs, religious groups, and political parties. This book develops a detailed account of such communities in terms of the rational structure of their members’ reactive attitudes, arguing that they are fundamental in three interrelated ways to understanding what it is to be a person. First, it is only by being a member of a community of respect that one can be a responsible agent having dignity; such an agent therefore has certain rights as well as the authority to demand that fellow members recognize her dignity and follow the norms of the community, norms compliance with which they likewise have the authority to demand from her. Second, by prescribing or proscribing both actions and values, communities of respect can shape the identities of its members in ways that others have the authority to enforce, thereby revealing an important interpersonal dimension of the identities of persons. Finally, all of this is grounded in a distinctively interpersonal form of practical rationality in virtue of which we jointly have reasons to recognize the dignity and authority of fellow members and so to comply with their authoritative demands, as well as to respect (and so comply with) the norms of the community. Hence we persons are essentially social creatures.
Love, Friendship, and the Self: Intimacy, Identification, and the Social Nature of Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Categories: love/friendship, personhood, rationality, moral psychology, mind/emotion. Preprint.
Recent Western thought has consistently emphasized the individualistic strand in our understanding of persons at the expense of the social strand. Thus, it is generally thought that persons are self-determining and autonomous, where these are understood to be capacities we exercise most fully on our own, apart from others, whose influence on us tends to undermine that autonomy. Love, Friendship, and the Self argues that we must reject a strongly individualistic conception of persons if we are to make sense of significant interpersonal relationships and the importance they can have in our lives. It presents a new account of love as intimate identification and of friendship as a kind of plural agency, in each case grounding and analyzing these notions in terms of interpersonal emotions. At the center of this account is an analysis of how our emotional connectedness with others is essential to our very capacities for autonomy and self-determination: we are rational and autonomous only because of and through our inherently social nature. By focusing on the role that relationships of love and friendship have both in the initial formation of our selves and in the on-going development and maturation of adult persons, Helm significantly alters our understanding of persons and the kind of psychology we persons have as moral and social beings.
Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Categories: personhood, mind/emotion, value theory, agency. Preprint.
How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires and evaluative judgements and of their rational interconnections. The result is an innovative theory of practical rationality and of how we can control not only what we do but also what we value and who we are as persons.
PDFs of final articles available on request.
Choose a category below.
“Cognitivist Theories of Emotions”. In: category: mind/emotion. Preprint.
Cognitivist theories of emotions understand emotions to be caused or
constituted by “cognitions”: information-carrying mental states that are
to be distinguished not only from non-intentional “feelings” but also
from desire-like states. This chapter identifies some criteria in terms of
which any theory of the emotions can be assessed and reviews the
central philosophical and psychological versions of cognitivism in light
of these criteria. Finally, the chapter raises three interrelated problems
for specifically cognitivist theories of emotions (the problem of circularity,
the problem of recalcitrance, and the problem of phenomenal unity), and
suggests that solving them requires blurring or rejecting the distinction
between cognitions and other types of mental states, a distinction at the
foundation of cognitivist theories of emotions.Abstract
“Hermeneutical Discomfort: Emotions, Interpretation, and Value Inquiry”. In: Experiencing Agency in Feeling. Ed. by Philipp Schmidt and Thomas Fuchs. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Forthcoming. Categories: mind/emotion, moral psychology, value theory.
“ Formy Przyjaźni (Forms of Friendship)”. In: Filozofuj! 8.4 (July 2023), pp. 14–16. Translated into Polish; original title: “Forms of Friendship”. Categories: love/friendship, public philosophy. Preprint.
“ Affective Intentionality and the Reactive Attitudes”. In: The Routledge
Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion. Ed. by Thomas Szanto and Hilge
Landweer. 1st ed. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. Abingdon, Oxon:
Routledge, 2020. Chap. 20, pp. 227–38. Categories: mind/emotion, moral
psychology. Preprint. How should we understand the phenomenology
of emotions? One standard way is to distinguish sharply between
their intentionality and their phenomenology, understanding their
phenomenology in terms of something like “bodily sensations”, which are
simply added on to an independent account of their intentionality. I have
elsewhere (Helm, 2011) argued that this strategy fails and that we should
instead understand emotions to be “felt evaluations”: phenomenological
feelings with evaluative content or, alternately, a distinctively affective form
of intentionality. This paper repeats those arguments and extends them to
thinking about the reactive attitudes: emotions like gratitude, resentment,
approbation, and guilt. In particular, the phenomenology of the reactive
attitudes cannot be neatly distinguished from the thought that their targets
are responsible for wronging or benefiting me. In applying my earlier account
to the reactive attitudes, I shall make apparent commonly ignored aspects
of the affectivity of the reactive attitudes, whereby they bind us together
through our having shared values and communal norms.Abstract
“L’Amitié”. In: Petit Traité Des Valeurs. Ed. by Julien Deonna and Emma
Tieffenbach. Paris: Ithaque, 2018, pp. 14–21. Categories: love/friendship,
public philosophy. Preprint. Many have argued that friendship is central
to living a fulfilling life. Yet there is a remarkable diversity of kinds of
friendship. Setting aside Facebook “friends”—people tagged as friends on
social media but who are not friends in any meaningful sense—the kind of
intimacy involved in friendship can vary widely, from acquaintance friends
to life partners; and the context and scope of friendship can likewise vary,
from tennis buddies, who meet to play once a month, to life partners, who
share their lives with each other in ways they together find important.
Part of the challenge in understanding friendship and its value, therefore,
lies in recognizing the types or ranges of intimacy, context, and scope that
friendship can involve.Abstract
“ Emotional Expression, Commitment, and Joint Value”. In: Expression of
Emotion: Philosophical, Psychological and Legal Perspectives. Ed. by Catherine
Abell and Joel Smith. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016,
pp. 95–114. Categories: mind/emotion, value theory. Preprint. After
distinguishing between evincings and expressions of emotions, I argue
that emotional expressions are more than mere reports of the content
of emotions. Rather, they are expressions of commitments to the values
underlying these emotions. Central to this argument is an understanding
of the expression of the reactive attitudes—emotions like gratitude,
resentment, approbation, and guilt. For in expressing the reactive attitudes
we call others to account in light of shared norms, thereby not merely
communicating a positive or negative evaluation of the other’s actions but
also expressing the underlying values as our values in a way that can
preserve and reinforce this shared sense of value.Abstract
“ Emotions and Recalcitrance: Reevaluating the Perceptual Model”. In:
dialectica 69.3 (2015), pp. 417–33. Categories: mind/emotion, agency,
rationality, value theory. Preprint. One central argument in favor of
perceptual accounts of emotions concerns recalcitrant emotions: emotions
that persist in the face of repudiating judgments. For, it is argued, to
understand how the conflict between recalcitrant emotions and judgment
falls short of incoherence in judgment, we need to understand recalcitrant
emotions to be something like perceptual illusions of value, so that in
normal, non-recalcitrant cases emotions are non-illusory perceptions of
value. I argue that these arguments fail and that a closer examination of
recalcitrant emotions reveals important disanalogies with perception that
undermine the perceptual model of emotions.Abstract
“ Trust as a Reactive Attitude”. In: Oxford Studies in Agency and
Responsibility: “Freedom and Resentment” at Fifty. Ed. by David Shoemaker
and Neal Tognazzini. Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014,
pp. 187–215. Category: moral psychology. Preprint. The reactive attitudes
are central to our practices of holding each other responsible and so to a
certain form of human community. This paper argues that trust is a reactive
attitude—indeed that without self, personal, and vicarious reactive trust
these practices, this form of human community, and responsible agency
would not be possible. Moreover, understanding trust in this way helps
resolve several problems that have confronted philosophers thinking about
trust, including the distinction between trust and reliance, the conditions of
the rationality of trust and the nature of trustworthiness, and how my trust
can motivate your behavior.Abstract
What Is the Role of Love in Human Freedom? 2014. URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20150317180132/https://www.bigquestionsonline.com/content/what-role-love-human-freedom (visited on 08/19/2014). Categories: love/friendship, agency, moral psychology, public philosophy.
“ Paternalistic Love and Reasons for Caring”. In: Autonomy and the
Self. Ed. by Michael Kühler and Nadja Jelinek. Dordrecht: Springer,
2013, pp. 213–30. Categories: moral psychology, rationality, personhood.
Preprint. What reasons can children have for coming to care about
particular things so that they can develop into responsible adults? This
question raises issues both about the status of such reasons as “internal”
or “external” to the child’s subjective motivational set and about the
role of adults in guiding children’s choices. In confronting this latter
question, Tamar Schapiro argues that adults can adopt what amounts
to a two-pronged strategy: of rewarding or punishing the child and
of offering explanations and justifications. Such a strategy, however,
ignores the special role loving caregivers can play in a child’s life. By
developing an account of such paternalistically loving relationships, I
show how the caregiver’s conception of the child’s well-being can come
to inform the child’s own sense of herself and so to provide her with
essentially interpersonal reasons for caring. Indeed, such reasons can be
both normatively and motivationally binding on the child even though she
may not yet be in a position to understand them. That such reasons are
essentially interpersonal seems to make otiose whether they are “internal”
or “external,” thereby rendering that distinction less important than we
might have thought.Abstract
“Affektive Intentionalität: Holistisch Und Vielschichtig”. In: Affektive
Intentionalität: Beiträge Zur Welterschließenden Funktion Der Menschlichen
Gefühle. Ed. by Jan Slaby, Achim Stephan, Henrik Walter, and Sven
Walter. Trans. by Jean Moritz Müller. Paderborn: mentis, 2011, pp. 72–99.
Categories: mind/emotion, value theory. Preprint. Cognitivist theories
of emotions, the dominant philosophical theory as recently as 15 years
ago and still highly influential in psychology today, understand emotions
to be essentially clusters of beliefs and desires. Thus, cognitivists claim,
what it is to be afraid of something is to believe it dangerous and want
to get away. The intentionality of emotions is therefore understood to be
dependent on that of the constitutive beliefs and desires, and it seems
that there is nothing we could call a distinctively “affective” intentionality.
Indeed, for cognitivists affect is seemingly added on as an afterthought:
the relevant belief and desire somehow come packaged together with a
bodily sensation (of a sinking feeling in your gut, for example), and it is
this packaging of those intentional states with a feeling that was supposed
to account for their affective nature. As I shall argue, such cognitivist
accounts of emotions fail to capture the distinctively affective character of
emotions. A central reason for this failure lies in the kind of evaluations
that emotions essentially involve. Cognitivist theories must understand
emotional evaluations to be a part of either the belief or the desire; in
either case, they are supposed to be intelligible prior to the emotions
themselves. My contention is that this is false: we cannot make sense of
these evaluations except in terms of the emotions themselves, and it is this
fact about emotions that enables us to understand affective intentionality.
That is, I shall argue, what is characteristic of affective intentionality is
that it essentially involves evaluations that are felt, where such feelings are
simultaneously both responsive to and constitutive of that evaluation. Our
felt awareness of emotional objects as good or bad in some way just is a
matter of our being emotionally pleased or pained by these objects, and
this fact about emotions is central to understanding the nature of affective
intentionality.Abstract
“ Love as Intimate Identification”. In: Philosophic Exchange 40.1 (2010),
pp. 20–37. Categories: moral psychology, personhood, love/friendship. It
is widely acknowledged that love is a distinctively intimate form of concern
in which we in some sense identify with our beloveds; it is common,
moreover, to construe such identification in terms of the lover’s taking
on the interests of the beloved. From this starting point, Harry Frankfurt
argues that the paradigm form of love is that between parents and infants
or young children. I think this is mistaken: the kind of loving attitude or
relationship we can have towards or with young children is distinct in
kind from that which we can have towards adult persons, as is revealed by
reflection on the depth of love and its phenomenology. My aim is to present
an alternative conception of the sort of distinctively intimate identification
at issue in love, arguing that this account makes better sense of love and
our experience of love.Abstract
“Emotions and Motivation: Reconsidering Neo-Jamesian Accounts”. In:
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Ed. by Peter Goldie. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 303–23. Categories: mind/emotion,
rationality, agency. Preprint. Emotions are notorious for their irrationality,
and nowhere does this irrationality show up more clearly than in their
effects on motivation. Thus, to take some stereotyped examples, fear, anger,
and jealousy frequently seem to move us to act contrary to our better
judgment. Recently, however, there has been increasing emphasis on the
rationality of emotions and their place in practical reason. Thus, while
deliberating about what to do, although we may be able to articulate
reasons for and against each option, we may not be able to say why
the weight of these reasons favor one over the others; in such cases,
we may simply go with the one that “feels” right—that resonates more
fully with our emotional sense of our circumstances—and such an appeal
to emotions seems appropriate. I argue that emotions are fundamental
to motivation and practical reasoning. In particular, emotions motivate
not because they involve mere dispositions to behave but rather because
they are rational responses to things we care about, responses that
sometimes rationally demand intentional action. This, together with the
way our linguistic concepts can inform these emotional responses, makes
for rational interconnections with evaluative judgments that allow our
emotions to play a significant role in our determining what to do.Abstract
“ Emotions as Evaluative Feelings”. In: Emotion Review 1.3 (2009),
pp. 248–55. Categories: mind/emotion, value theory. Preprint. The
phenomenology of emotions has traditionally been understood in terms
of bodily sensations they involve. This is a mistake. We should instead
understand their phenomenology in terms of their distinctively evaluative
intentionality. Emotions are essentially affective modes of response to the
ways our circumstances come to matter to us, and so they are ways
of being pleased or pained by those circumstances. Making sense of
the intentionality and phenomenology of emotions in this way requires
rejecting traditional understandings of intentionality and so coming to see
emotions as a distinctive and irreducible class of mental states lying at the
intersection of intentionality, phenomenology, and motivation.Abstract
“Gefühlte Bewertungen: Eine Theorie Der Lust Und Des Schmerzes”. In: Philosophie Der Gefühle. Ed. by Sabine A. Döring. Trans. by Jean Moritz Müller. Suhrkamp, 2009, pp. 398–430. Categories: mind/emotion, rationality, value theory.
“ Love, Identification, and the Emotions”. In: American Philosophical
Quarterly 46.1 (2009), pp. 39–59. Categories: moral psychology,
personhood, value theory, love/friendship. Preprint. Standard accounts
of love, I argue, fail to make sense of the kind of intimacy love
essentially involves because they understand such intimacy in tacitly
egocentric terms and then either embrace it or recoil from it—in each case
unsatisfactorily. By developing an account of emotions like pride and shame
as “person-focused” and so analyzing their rational interconnections, I
offer a non-egocentric account of intimacy as a kind of identification: an
identification which, when reflexive, constitutes one’s own identity and,
when non-reflexive, constitutes the close, personal attachment to another
that love is.Abstract
“ Self-Love and the Structure of Personal Values”. In: Emotions, Ethics, and
Authenticity. Ed. by Mikko Salmela and Verena E. Mayer. Consciousness
and Emotion. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2009, pp. 11–32. Categories:
value theory, personhood, love/friendship. Preprint. Authenticity, it is
plausible to suppose, is a feature of one’s identity as a person—of one’s
sense of the kind of life worth living. Most attempts to explicate this notion
of a person’s identity do so in terms of an antecedent understanding of
what it is for a person to value something. This is, I argue, a mistake: a
concern is not intelligible as a value apart from the place it has within
a larger identity that the value serves in turn to constitute; to assume
otherwise is to risk leaving out the very person whose identity these values
allegedly constitute. By contrast, I offer an account of values as always
already a part of one’s identity. I do so by providing an analysis of values
in terms of what I call ’person-focused emotions,’ emotions like pride and
shame. Such emotions, I argue, involve a commitment to the import of a
person primarily and, only secondarily, to things valued, and in this way
enable us to understand what it is to value these things for the sake of the
person. The upshot is a more satisfying account of a person’s identity and
values, an account that can provide the necessary background for a more
thorough investigation of authenticity.Abstract
“ The Import of Human Action”. In: Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions. Ed. by Jesus Aguilar and Andrei Buckareff. Copenhagen: Automatic Press/VIP, 2009, pp. 89–100. Categories: mind/emotion, agency, public philosophy. Preprint.
“ Friendship”. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. June 2005. Revised: Fall 2009, Fall 2013, Fall 2017, Fall 2021. Categories: moral psychology, love/friendship.
“ Love”. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. June 2005. Revised: Fall 2009, Fall 2013, Fall 2017, Fall 2021. Categories: love/friendship, moral psychology.
“ Action for the Sake of …: Caring and the Rationality of (Social) Action”. In: Analyse & Kritik 24.2 (2002), pp. 189–208. Categories: agency, rationality.
“ Felt Evaluations: A Theory of Pleasure and Pain”. In: American
Philosophical Quarterly 39.1 (2002), pp. 13–30. Categories: mind/emotion,
rationality, value theory. Preprint. This paper argues that pleasure
and pains are not qualia and they are not to be analyzed in terms of
supposedly antecedently intelligible mental states like bodily sensation or
desire. Rather, pleasure and pain are characteristic of a distinctive kind
of evaluation that is common to emotions, desires, and (some) bodily
sensations. These are felt evaluations: passive responses to attend to and
be motivated by the import of something impressing itself on us, responses
that are nonetheless simultaneously constitutive of that import by virtue of
the broader rational patterns of which they are a part and that they serve
to de?ne. This account of felt evaluations makes sense of the way in which
pleasures and pains grab our attention and motivate us to act and of the
peculiar dual objectivity and subjectivity of their implicit evaluations, while
o?ering a phenomenology adequate to both emotional and bodily pleasures
and pains.Abstract
“ Emotions and Practical Reason: Rethinking Evaluation and Motivation”.
In: Noûs 35.2 (2001), pp. 190–213. Categories: moral psychology, agency,
rationality. Preprint. The motivational problem is the problem of
understanding how we can have rational control over what we do. In
the face of phenomena like weakness of the will, it is commonly thought
that evaluation and reason can always remain intact even as we sever
their connection with motivation; consequently, solving the motivational
problem is thought to be a matter of figuring out how to bridge this
inevitable gap between evaluation and motivation. I argue that this is
fundamentally mistaken and results in a conception of practical reason
that is motivationally impotent. Instead, I argue, a proper understanding of
evaluation and practical reason must include not only evaluative judgments
but emotions as well. By analyzing the role of emotions in evaluation
and the rational interconnections among emotions, desires, and evaluative
judgments, I articulate a new conception of evaluation and motivation
according to which there is a conceptual connection between them, albeit
one that allows for the possibility of weakness of the will.Abstract
“ Emotional Reason: How to Deliberate about Value”. In: American
Philosophical Quarterly 37.1 (2000), pp. 1–22. Categories: moral psychology,
rationality, value theory, personhood. Preprint. Deliberation about
personal, non-moral values involves elements of both invention and
discovery. Thus, we invent our values by freely choosing them, where
such distinctively human freedom is essential to our defining and taking
responsibility for the kinds of persons we are; nonetheless, we also discover
our values insofar as we can deliberate about them rationally and arrive
at non-arbitrary decisions about what has value in our lives. Yet these
notions of invention and discovery seem inconsistent with each other, and
the possibility of deliberation about value therefore seems paradoxical.
My aim is to argue that this apparent paradox is no paradox at all. I
offer an account of what it is to value something largely in terms of
emotions and desires. By examining the rational interconnections among
emotions and evaluative judgments, I argue for an account both of how
judgments can shape our emotions, thereby shaping our values in a way
that makes intelligible the possibility of inventing our values, and of how
our emotions can simultaneously rationally constrain correct deliberation,
thereby making intelligible the possibility of discovering our values. The
result is a rejection of both cognitivist and non-cognitivist accounts of value
and deliberation about value.Abstract
“ Freedom of the Heart”. In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77.2 (1996), pp. 71–87. Categories: mind/emotion, moral psychology, agency. Preprint.
“ Integration and Fragmentation of the Self”. In: Southern Journal of Philosophy 34.1 (1996), pp. 43–63. Categories: moral psychology, personhood, value theory. Preprint.
“ The Significance of Emotions”. In: American Philosophical Quarterly 31.4 (1994), pp. 319–31. Categories: mind/emotion, agency. Preprint.
“ Why We Believe in Induction: Standards of Taste and Hume’s Two
Definitions of Causation”. In: Hume Studies 19.1 (1993), pp. 117–40.
Categories: rationality, history. Preprint. It is somewhat striking that two
interrelated elements of Hume’s account of causation have received so
little attention in the secondary literature on the subject. The first is the
distinction of causation into the natural and the philosophical relations:
Although many have tried to give accounts of why Hume presents two
definitions of causality, it is often not clear in these accounts that the one
definition is of causality as a natural relation and the other is of causality
as a philosophical relation, where to make the contrast between these
two kinds of relations we need to give a naturalistic account of natural
relations and a normative account of philosophical relations. (That Hume
intends this to be the contrast will be defended in more detail below.) The
second element is that, in many cases of our inferences from cause to effect,
“we must follow our taste and sentiment” (A Treatise of Human Nature
[T], 103), where the appeal to taste here, as in morality and aesthetics,
is not to be understood as up to the individual. Rather, Hume makes it
clear both in Book 3 of the Treatise and in “Of the Standard of Taste”
that there are standards to which our individual judgments (in morality,
aesthetics, or causality) must conform. My purpose in this paper is to
attempt to provide an interpretation of Hume’s account of causality that
brings these two elements explicitly into the foreground. This interpretation
is, to a greater extent than usual, a reconstruction of Hume’s account of
our causal inferences, drawing, as I have indicated above, from a range of
texts not normally associated with Hume’s discussion of causality. As such,
this interpretation should be considered as exploratory in nature, perhaps
focussing too single-mindedly on these two elements in an attempt to make
out as strong a case as possible for their relevance in understanding Hume’s
account of causal inference.Abstract
Cowling Distinguished Visiting Professor of Philosophy, Carleton College (2018)
Templeton Foundation Grant (2012–15): Love and Human Agency: An Interdisciplinary Investigation (with Agnieszka Jaworska and Jeffrey Seidman), $640,317
NEH Fellowship (2012–13): “Defining Moral Communities: Respect, Dignity, and the Reactive Attitudes”, $50,400
Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Faculty Fellow (2012–13), Princeton University Center for Human Values, $47,000
Bradley R. Dewey Award for Outstanding Scholarship (2012), Franklin & Marshall College
Brocher Foundation Award (2011) for a workshop on “The Neuroethics of Caring” (with Agnieszka Jaworska), $36,000
NEH Fellowship (2005–06): “Love, Friendship and the Self: The Emotional and Interpersonal Grounds of Autonomy”, $40,000
NSF-CCLI Grant (2001–04): Creation of Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (with Tony Chemero), $173,281
ACLS Fellowship (1998–99): “Emotion, Judgment, and Practical Reason: How to Deliberate about Value”, $20,000
NEH Summer Stipend (1998): “Reason, Emotion, and Evaluative Judgment: How to Think about the Meaning of Life”, $6,000
The following is a list of students with whom I’ve worked on research projects:
Anzhou He (Hackman Scholar, 2023): “Resisting the Misconstruction of Social Identities: The Interpersonal Call of Ontological Reactive Attitudes”
Raluca Rilla (Hackman Scholar, 2022): “Objective Self-Constitution of Personhood”
Grace Adams (Hackman Scholar, 2017): “Race, Gender, and Community”
Dan Kaplan (Hackman Scholar, 2011): “Joint Caring about Truth”
Kathryn Kutz (Hackman Scholar, 2009): “Truth, Emotion, and Shared Commitment”
Neal Swisher (Coutros Scholar, 2004): “Artificial-Life Learning in Mobile Robotics”
Yaroslava Babych and Aleksandra Markovic (Hackman Scholars, 1998), “Moods as a Sense of Priorities”
Many of these courses satisfy requirements for our interdisciplinary majors in Cognitive Science and Moral Psychology.
Race and gender are centrally important to each of our lives. But what are they exactly? How many races or genders are there? Who has what race or what gender? How are these answers determined? (Are race and gender biologically real? Are they socially constructed? Would their being socially constructed make them any less real?) How does someone’s race or gender affect their social position? What injustices do these social positions involve, and what can or should we do about them? How are these social positions affected by intersecting social identity categories, including not only race and gender but also class, sexuality, ability, religion, and more? Drawing on fields such as philosophy, sociology, women’s and gender studies, and critical race theory, we will critically examine a variety of answers to these questions, in the process trying to understand how we can have reasonable and productive disagreements about these contentious and politically charged issues.
This course provides an introduction to some central problems, concepts, and methods of cognitive science and moral psychology. We will address questions concerning the nature of intelligence, the relationship between minds and bodies, and the basis of moral beliefs and behaviors. These explorations will bridge the sciences and humanities by taking a fundamentally interdisciplinary perspective.
This class is designed as a general introduction to the philosophy of mind (and, consequently, as an introduction to the philosophical side of both majors in the Scientific and Philosophical Studies of Mind program: Cognitive Science and Moral Psychology). We will begin by examining the mind–body problem, a problem which arises out of our differing conceptions of the natural world and of our minds. In particular, science tells us that the body is just a hunk of physical matter that obeys the laws of nature mechanistically—mindlessly. The mind, of course, is anything but mindless. So what’s the connection between the two? How should we conceive of the mind in relation to the body? In trying to answer this question, we will critically examine several different purported solutions to this problem and assess how they fare with respect to understanding particular issues that arise in the context of this mind–body problem: the nature of representation, consciousness, psychological explanation, freedom, and meaning, and identity. In addressing these questions, we shall gain a clearer understanding of the strengths, weaknesses, and implications of the various theories about what the mind is and its relation to the body.
It has long been perceived by many philosophers that there is a problem about the relationship between the mind and the body. The body, after all, is just a hunk of physical matter that obeys the laws of nature mechanistically—mindlessly—whereas the mind, of course, is anything but mindless. So what’s the connection between the two? How do we conceive of the mind in relation to the body? In this course we’ll examine mostly contemporary accounts of the relation in an attempt to understand whether there really is a mind–body problem and, if so, how to solve it. But this course is about more than just the mind and its place in the broader world; it’s about the nature of that world, too. In the course of trying to understand how our thoughts can be about anything in the world, we’ll need to think about the nature of the world such that our thoughts can be about it.
Long neglected in philosophy, the emotions have recently and increasingly come to be seen as important both in their own right and for their bearing on a wide variety of issues, including (a) the mind–body problem and the nature of consciousness and intentionality, (b) the nature of rationality, (c) aesthetics, (d) interpersonal relationships, and (e) moral psychology and metaethics. My intention in this course is to focus on the first two such issues, since the other issues are covered more fully in other courses. However, in doing so it is important that we have a sufficiently rich understanding of the place emotions can have in our lives, an understanding that many philosophers and psychologists tend to simplify and diminish.
Philosophers tend to understand the concept of a person in two ways: as a metaphysical notion and as a moral notion. Moral personhood is roughly an understanding of ourselves as the subjects of moral rights and responsibilities. By contrast, to understand personhood as a metaphysical notion is to understand it as delineating a special category of being—as having or being a soul, for example. Typically, the metaphysical notion of personhood is thought to somehow underwrite our status as moral persons. Indeed, it is precisely because of this explanatory link between them that many philosophers think it is appropriate to understand the concept of personhood not as having two senses but rather as being a univocal concept with two aspects. Our aim in this course is to examine these notions and their interrelations, with an emphasis on our social nature.
Moral psychology is the study of us persons as responsible moral agents and subjects of value. As such, it is constrained by, and must cohere with, the facts about human psychology; but its primary focus is on human good, an evaluative notion. Topics include virtue and character, motivation and reasons, internal/external reasons and moral development, and responsibility and blame.
Love and friendship are undoubtedly important in our lives … but why? Although we commonly say that we “love” both chocolate cake and philosophy or that we are “friends” with people on Facebook, these seem to be thin surrogates for the potentially deep, rich, intimate, and rewarding attitudes and relationships we develop towards and with other persons. Clearly it is the latter that we interested in here: forms of love and friendship that apply paradigmatically to intimate relations among persons. In investigating personal love and friendship, we will encounter several problems concerning their justification, their bearing on the autonomy and identity of the individual, and the place their value has within a broader system of values, including moral values.
Recently many philosophers have argued that certain interpersonal emotions, such as resentment, indignation, guilt, gratitude, and approbation, are fundamental to a host of interconnected issues in ethics, including the nature of respect, dignity, responsibility and freedom, and the origins of moral values. This class will closely examine these claims and arguments with the aim of understanding more clearly how moral psychology and metaethics intersect.